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Abstract
We examine the combination of two directions in the field of privacy concerning computations
over distributed private inputs – secure function evaluation (SFE) and differential privacy. While
in both the goal is to privately evaluate some function of the individual inputs, the privacy
requirements are significantly different. The general feasibility results for SFE suggest a natural
paradigm for implementing differentially private analyses distributively: First choose what to
compute, i.e., a differentially private analysis; Then decide how to compute it, i.e., construct an
SFE protocol for this analysis.
We initiate an examination whether there are advantages to a paradigm where both decisions
are made simultaneously. In particular, we investigate under which accuracy requirements it is
beneficial to adapt this paradigm for computing a collection of functions including binary sum,
gap threshold, and approximate median queries. Our results imply that when computing the
binary sum of n distributed inputs then:
• When we require that the error is o(√n) and the number of rounds is constant, there is
no benefit in the new paradigm.
• When we allow an error of O(√n), the new paradigm yields more efficient protocols when
we consider protocols that compute symmetric functions.
Our results also yield new separations between the local and global models of computations for
private data analysis.
Keywords. Differential privacy, Secure Function Evaluation, Sum Queries.
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1 Introduction
We examine the combination of two directions in the field of privacy concerning distributed private
inputs – secure function evaluation [26, 18, 4, 1] and differential privacy [11, 8]. While in both
the goal is to privately evaluate some function of individual inputs, the privacy requirements are
significantly different.
Secure function evaluation (SFE) allows n parties p1, . . . , pn, sharing a common interest in
distributively computing a function f(·) of their inputs x = (x1, . . . , xn), to compute f(x) while
making sure that no coalition of t or less curious parties learns more than the outcome of f(x). I.e.,
for every such coalition, executing the SFE protocol is equivalent to communicating with a trusted
party that is given the private inputs x and releases f(x). SFE has been the subject of extensive
cryptographic research (initiated in [26, 18, 4, 1]), and SFE protocols exist for any feasible function
f(·) in a variety of general settings.
SFE is an important tool for achieving privacy of individual entries – no information about
these entries is leaked beyond the outcome f(x). However this guarantee is insufficient in many
applications, and care must be taken in choosing the function f(·) to be computed – any imple-
mentation, no matter how secure, of a function f(·) that leaks individual information would not
preserve individual privacy.
A criterion for functions that preserve privacy of individual entries, differential privacy, has
evolved in a sequence of recent works [7, 15, 14, 2, 11, 8, 9]. It has been demonstrated that dif-
ferentially private analyses exist for a variety of tasks including the approximation of numerical
functions (by adding carefully chosen random noise that conceals any single individual’s contribu-
tion) [11, 2, 22, 17], non-numerical analyses [20], datamining [2, 22], learning [2, 19], non-interactive
sanitization [3, 13, 16], and statistical analysis [10, 24].
Employing the generality of SFE, we can combine these to directions in a natural paradigm for
constructing protocols in which differential privacy is preserved:
1. Decide on what to compute. This can be, e.g., a differentially private analysis fˆ(·) that
approximates a desired analysis f(·). Designing fˆ(·) can be done while abstracting out all
implementation issues, assuming the computation is performed by a trusted party that only
announces the outcome of the analysis.
2. Decide on how to compute, i.e., construct an SFE protocol for computing fˆ(x) either by using
one of the generic transformations of the feasibility results mentioned above, or by crafting
an efficient protocol that utilizes the properties of fˆ(·).
This natural paradigm yields a conceptually simple recipe for constructing distributed analyses
preserving differential privacy, and, furthermore, allows a valuable separation of our examinations
of the what and how questions.
Comparing the privacy requirements of SFE protocols with differential privacy suggests, how-
ever, that this combination may result in sub-optimal protocols. For example, differential privacy
is only concerned with how the view of a coalition changes when one (or only few) of the inputs
are changed, whereas SFE protocols are required to keep these views indistinguishable even when
significant changes occur, if these changes do not affect the computed function’s outcome. Hence, it
may be advantageous to consider a paradigm where the analysis to be computed and the protocol
for computing it are chosen simultaneously.
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1.1 Our Underlying Models
The main distributed model we consider is of n honest-but-curious (a.k.a. semi-honest) parties
p1, . . . , pn that are connected via a complete network and perform a computation over their private
inputs x1, . . . , xn. Privacy is required to be maintained with respect to all coalitions of size up to
t. The model of honest-but-curious parties has been examined thoroughly in cryptography, and
was shown to enable SFE in a variety of settings [26, 18, 1, 4]. We change the standard definition
so that differential privacy has to be maintained with respect to coalitions of curious parties (see
Definition 2.4 below).
Another distributed model we consider is the local model1. Protocols executing in the local
model have a very simple communication structure, where each party pi can only communicate
with a designated honest-but-curious party C, which we refer to as a curator. The communication
can either be non-interactive, where each party sends a single message to the curator which replies
with the protocol’s outcome, or interactive, where several rounds of communication may take place.
While it is probably most natural to consider a setting where the players are computationally
limited (i.e., all are probabilistic polynomial time machines), we present our results in an informa-
tion theoretic setting. This choice has two benefits:
• Technically, it allows us to prove lower bounds on SFE protocols (where similar bounds
are not known for the computational setting). Hence, we can rigorously demonstrate when
constructing differentially private protocols is better than using the natural paradigm.
• On the flip side, our bounds on the information theoretic model demonstrate, for the first
time, a setting where reliance on computational hardness assumptions strictly improves the
construction of differentially private analyses.
1.2 Our Results
We initiate an examination of the paradigm where an analysis and the protocol for computing it
are chosen simultaneously. We begin with two examples that present the potential benefits of using
this paradigm: it can lead to simpler protocols, and more importantly it can lead to more efficient
protocols. For the latter we consider the Binary Sum function,
SUM(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
xi for xi ∈ {0, 1}.
The major part of this work examines whether constructing non-SFE protocols for computing
an approximation fˆ(·) to SUM(·) yields an efficiency gain2. Ignoring the dependency on the privacy
parameter, our first observation is that for approximations with additive error ≈ √n there is a gain
– for a natural class of symmetric approximation functions (informally, functions where the outcome
does not depend on the order of inputs), it is possible to construct differentially private protocols
that are much more efficient than any SFE protocol for a function in this class. Moreover, these
1Also referred to in the literature as randomized response and input perturbation. This model was originally
introduced by Warner [25] as a means of encouraging survey responders to answer truthfully, and has been studied
extensively since.
2We only consider oblivious protocols where the communication pattern is independent of input and randomness
(see Section 2.2).
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differentially private protocols are secure against coalitions of size up to t = n − 1, and need not
rely on secure channels.
The picture changes when we consider additive error smaller than
√
n. This follows from a
sequence of results:
1. We prove first that no such non-interactive protocols in the local model exist. Furthermore,
no local protocols with ℓ ≤ √n rounds and additive error √n/O˜(ℓ) exist.
2. We show that in particular, no local interactive protocol with o(
√
n/ log n) rounds exists for
computing SUM(·) within constant additive error (this is in contrast to the centralized setup
where SUM(·) can be computed within O(1) additive error).
3. Finally, we prove that the bounds on local protocols imply that no distributed protocols exist
that use nt/4 messages, and approximates SUM(·) within additive error √n/O˜(ℓ) in ℓ rounds.
Considering the natural paradigm, i.e., computing a differentially-private approximation to SUM(·)
using SFE, we get a protocol for approximating SUM(·) with O(1) additive error, and sending O(nt)
messages. Thus, for protocols with error o(
√
n/ε) and small number of rounds, there is no gain in
using the paradigm of a simultaneous design of the function and its protocol.
Our results imply that differentially private protocols constructed under computational hard-
ness assumptions, yielding a computational version of differential privacy (see Definition 2.5), are
provably more efficient than protocols that do not make use of computational hardness. For in-
stance, the phase transition we observe at θ(
√
n/ε) additive error does not hold in a computational
setting. See Example 2.6 for details.
1.3 Techniques
We prove our lowerbound for the distributed model in a sequence of reductions. We begin with a
simple reduction from any differentially private protocol for SUM to a gap version of the threshold
function, denoted GAP-TR. Henceforth, it is enough to prove our lowerbound for GAP-TR.
In the heart of our lowerbound for GAP-TR is a transformation from efficient distributed
protocols into local interactive protocols, showing that if there are distributed differentially-private
protocols for GAP-TR(·) in which half of the parties interact with less than t+1 parties, then there
exist differentially-private protocols for GAP-TR(·) in the local interactive model. This allows us
to prove our impossibility results in the local model, which is considerably simpler to analyze.
In analyzing the local non-interactive model, we prove lowerbounds borrowing from analyses
in [7, 14]. The main technical difference is that our analysis is a lowerbound and hence should hold
for general protocols, whereas the work in [7, 14] was concerned with proving feasibility of privacy
preserving computations (i.e., upperbounds), and hence they analyze of very specific protocols.
To extend our lowerbounds from the local non-interactive to interactive protocols, we decom-
pose an ℓ-round interactive protocol to ℓ one-round protocols, analyze the ℓ protocols, and use
composition to obtain the lowerbound.
1.4 Related Work
Secure function evaluation and private data analysis were first tied together in the Our Data, Our-
selves (ODO) protocols [9]. The constructions in [9] – distributed SFE protocols for generating
shares of random noise used in private data analyses – follow the natural paradigm discussed above
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(however, they avoid utilizing generic SFE feasibility results to gain on efficiency). We note that a
difference between the protocols in [9] and the discussion herein is that ODO protocols are secure
against malicious parties, in a computational setup, whereas we deal with honest-but-curious par-
ties, and mostly in an information theoretic setup. Following our work, computational differential
privacy was considered in [21]; they present several definitions of computational differential privacy,
study the relationships between these definitions, and construct efficient 2-party computational dif-
ferentially private protocols for approximating the distance between two vectors. In this work, we
supply a definition of computationally (t, ǫ)-differentially private protocols which is close to the
definition of IND-CDP privacy in [21].
Lowerbounds on the local non-interactive model were previously presented implicitly in [11, 23,
19], and explicitly in [7, 12]. The two latter works are mainly concerned with what is called the
global (or centralized) interactive setup, but have also implications to approximation to SUM in the
local non-interactive model, namely, that it is impossible to approximate it within additive error
c
√
n (for some constant c > 0), a slightly weaker result compared to our lowerbound of c
√
n/ε for
ε-differentially private local non-interactive protocols. However, (to the best of our understanding)
these implications of [7, 12] do not imply the lowerbounds we get for local interactive protocols and
distributed protocols.
Chor and Kushilevitz [5] consider the problem of securely computing modular sum when the
inputs are distributed. They show that this task can be done while sending roughly n(t + 1)/2
messages. Furthermore, they prove that this number of messages is optimal for a family of protocols
that they call oblivious. These are protocols where the communication pattern is fixed and does
not depend on the inputs or random inputs. In our work we extend their lowerbound result and
prove that with n(t+1)/4 messages no symmetric approximation for SUM with sub-linear additive
error can be computed in an oblivious protocol.
1.5 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we define differentially private analyses
and its extension to differentially private protocols (both information-theoretic and computational),
describe the local model of communication, and define the binary sum and gap threshold functions.
In Section 3, we present two motivating examples for our new methodology of simultaneously
solving how and what. In Section 4 we prove lowerbounds on the error of differentially private
protocols for computing the binary sum and gap threshold functions in the local model, and in
Section 5 we extend these lowerbounds to the distributed model. Finally, in Section 6 we prove
that an SFE protocol for computing a symmetric approximation of the sum function with less than
nt/4 messages has an error of Ω(n) (compared to a non-SFE protocol that approximates the sum
function with O(n) messages and an error of Ω(
√
n)).
2 Preliminaries
Notation. A vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) is an ordered sequence of n elements of some domain D.
Vectors x,x′ are neighboring if they differ on exactly one entry, and are T -neighboring if they differ
on a single entry whose index is not in T ⊂ [n].
The Laplace distribution, Lap(λ), is the continuous probability distribution with probability
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density function
h(y) =
exp(−|y|/λ)
2λ
.
For Y ∼ Lap(λ) we have that E[Y ] = 0, Var[Y ] = 2λ2, and Pr[|Y | > kλ] = e−k.
Definition 2.1 Let DI , DR, and R be sets. An n-ary randomized function is a function fˆ :
(DI)
n × DR → R, where D = DI is the domain of fˆ and DR is the set of random inputs. For
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Dn we usually write fˆ(x) with the underlying convention that fˆ(x1, . . . , xn) =
fˆ(x1, . . . , xn, r), where r is uniformly selected form DR. Following this convention, we also usually
omit DR from the notation and write fˆ : D
n → R.
2.1 Differential Privacy
Our privacy definition for distributed protocols (Definition 2.4 below) can be viewed as a distributed
variant of ε-differential privacy. Informally, a computation is differentially private if any change in
a single individual input may only induce a small change in the distribution on its outcomes.
Definition 2.2 (Differential privacy [11]) Let fˆ : Dn → R be a randomized function from
domain Dn to range R. We say that fˆ is ε-differentially private if for all neighboring vectors x,x′,
and for all possible sets of outcomes V ⊆ R it holds that
Pr[fˆ(x) ∈ V] ≤ eε · Pr[fˆ(x′) ∈ V].
The probability is taken over the randomness of fˆ .
Several frameworks for constructing differentially private functions by means of perturbation
are presented in the literature (see [11, 2, 22, 20]). The most basic transformation on a function
f that yields a differentially private function is via the framework of global sensitivity [11]. In this
framework the outcome is obtained by adding to f(x) noise sampled from the Laplace distribution,
calibrated to the global sensitivity of f , defined as
GSf = max |f(x)− f(x′)|, with the maximum taken over neighboring x,x′.
Formally, fˆ is defined as
fˆ(x) = f(x) + Y , where Y ∼ Lap(GSf/ε). (1)
Example 2.3 The binary sum function SUM : {0, 1}n → R is defined as SUM(x) =∑ni=1 xi. For
every two neighboring x,x′ ∈ {0, 1}n we have that |SUM(x) − SUM(x′)| = 1 and hence GSSUM =
1. Applying Equation (1), we get an ε-differentially private approximation, fˆ(x) = SUM(x) +
Y , where Y ∼ Lap(1/ε), that is, we get a differentially private approximation of SUM with O(1)
additive error.
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2.2 Differentially Private Protocols
We consider a distributed setting, where n parties p1, . . . , pn hold private inputs x1, . . . , xn respec-
tively and engage in a protocol Π in order to compute (or approximate) a function f(·) of their
joint inputs. Parties are honest-but-curious, which means they follow the prescribed randomized
protocol. However, as the execution of the protocol terminates, colluding parties can try to infer
information about inputs of parties outside the coalition, given their joint view of the execution.
The protocol Π is executed in a synchronous environment with point-to-point secure (untap-
pable) communication channels, and is required to preserve privacy with respect to coalitions of
up to t parties. Following [5], we assume that the protocol Π has a fixed-communication pattern
(such protocols are called oblivious), i.e., every channel is either (i) active in every run of Π (i.e.,
at least one bit is sent over the channel), or (ii) never used3. Parties that are adjacent to at least
t+ 1 active channels are called popular other parties are called lonely.
The main definition we will work with is an extension of Definition 2.2 to a distributed setting.
Informally, we require that differential privacy is preserved with respect to any coalition of size up
to t.
Definition 2.4 (Distributed differential privacy) Let Π be a protocol between n (honest-but-
curious) parties. For a set T ⊆ [n] and fixed inputs x = (x1, . . . , xn), let ViewT (x1, . . . , xn) be the
random variable containing the inputs of the parties in T (i.e., {xi}i∈T ), the random inputs of the
parties in T , and the messages that the parties in T received during the execution of the protocol
with private inputs x = (x1, . . . , xn) (the randomness is taken over the random inputs of the parties
not in T ).
We say that Π is (t, ε)-differentially private if for all T ⊂ [n], where |T | ≤ t, for all T -neighboring
x,x′, and for all possible sets VT of views of the parties in T :
Pr[ViewT (x) ∈ VT ] ≤ eε · Pr[ViewT (x′) ∈ VT ], (2)
where the probabilities are taken over the random inputs of the parties in the protocol Π.
An equivalent requirement is that for all T ⊂ [n], where |T | ≤ t, for all T -neighboring x,x′,
and for all distinguishers D (i.e., functions, not necessarily efficiently computable, from views to
{0, 1}),
Pr[D(ViewT (x)) = 1] ≤ eε · Pr[D(ViewT (x′)) = 1].
This requirement can be relaxed to only consider distinguishers that are computationally bounded:
Definition 2.5 (Computational distributed differential privacy) We say that Π is compu-
tationally (t, ε)-differentially private if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D, and for
every polynomial p(·), there exists k0 such that for all k ≥ k0, for all T ⊂ [n], where |T | ≤ t, and
for all T -neighboring inputs x,x′ ∈ ({0, 1}k)n:
Pr[D(ViewT (x)) = 1] ≤ eε · Pr[D(ViewT (x′)) = 1] + 1
p(n · k) ,
where the probabilities are taken over the random inputs of the parties in protocol Π and the ran-
domness of D.
3Our proofs also work in a relaxed setting where every channel is either (i) used in at least a constant fraction of
the runs of Π (where the probability is taken over the coins of Π), or (ii) is never used.
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Example 2.6 We next describe a computationally (n/2, ε)-differentially private protocol for com-
puting SUM with O(log n/ǫ) additive error, O(n) messages, and constant number of rounds. This
protocol uses a homomorphic encryption scheme with threshold decryption (that is, only the sets of
all parties can decrypt messages). For example, if we use ElGamal encryption, the distributed key
generation and decryption require one round in which each party sends one message. The protocol
works in three phases:
Key Generation. The parties generate public and private keys for the homomorphic encryption
scheme with threshold decryption.
Encryption. Each party pi chooses a random noisei (according to a distribution that will be defined
later), computes yi = xi + noisei, encrypts yi using the public encryption key and sends the
encryption to p1.
Decryption. Party p1 computes z, an encryption of y =
∑
i=1n yi (this is possible as the encryption
scheme is homomorphic). p1 sends z to each pi, which in return sends a decryption message
back to p1. Finally, p1 decrypts y from the decryption messages and sends y to all parties.
One way to generate each party’s noise is for each party to sample from the Normal distribution
with mean zero and variance 6 log2 n/(nε2). Since the sum of normal random variables is a normal
random variable, y =
∑
i=1n xi+noise where noise is sampled from a normal distribution with mean
zero and variance 6 log2 n/ε2. Furthermore, even if a coalition of n/2 parties subtracts the noise
that its parties added to y, the variance of the remaining noise is 3 log2 n/ε2. Using the analysis
of [9], the protocol is a computationally (n/2, ε)-differentially private protocol which with constant
probability has error O(log n/ǫ).
The above protocol is a computationally (n/2, ε)-differentially private protocol for computing
SUM with O(log n/ǫ) additive error, O(n) messages, and constant number of rounds. In contrast,
we prove that (n/2, ε)-differentially information-theoretically private protocol for computing SUM
with o(
√
n) additive error and constant number of rounds must send Ω(n2) messages. Thus, our
results shows that requiring only computational differentially-privacy does result in more efficient
protocols.
Using standard SFE feasibility results (in the computational setting), it is possible now to prove
that the natural paradigm presented in Section 1 yields protocols that adhere to Definition 2.5.
Consider an ǫ-differentially private data analysis fˆ and a computationally bounded distinguisher
D, trying distinguish between a computation of an SFE protocol computing fˆ with neighboring
inputs x and x′. Since, fˆ preserves differential privacy the distributions on the outputs must be
ε close, the same must hold for the random variables describing the adversary’s view (up to some
negligible function in the length of the (concatenated) inputs). We get:
Lemma 2.7 (Informal) Let fˆ be ε-differentially private, and let Π be a t-secure protocol comput-
ing fˆ , then Π is computationally (t, ε)-differentially private.
In the above lemma, the if the t-secure protocol Π computing fˆ has perfect security, then Π is
information-theoretically (t, ε)-differentially private.
Remark 2.8 We will only consider protocols computing a (randomized) function fˆ(·) resulting in
all parties computing the same outcome of fˆ(x). This can be achieved, e.g., by having one party
compute fˆ(x) and send the outcome to all other parties.
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2.3 Distributed Protocols – Basic Observations
The following notation and basic observations are used throughout the paper.
Notation 2.9 Fix an n-party randomized protocol Π and fix some communication transcript c.
Assume that party pi holds an input xi and receives messages according to the transcript c. We
define αci (xi) to be the probability that on input xi party pi sends messages that are consistent with
transcript c, given that it receives messages that are consistent with c. The probability is taken
over the randomness of party pi.
Let ℓ be the number of rounds in Π. Assume, without loss of generality, that pi receives and
sends messages in every round, and let βcj (where 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ) be the probability on input xi party pi
sends in round j messages that are consistent with transcript c, provided that in previous rounds
pi sees messages that are consistent with c. Then, by the chain rule of conditional probabilities we
have that
αci (xi) =
ℓ∏
j=1
βcj .
Observe that the event that pi sends messages according to c when it sees messages according to
c depends only on the randomness ri, and hence this event is independent of whether the other
parties send messages according to c when they see messages according to c. We hence get the
following lemma:
Lemma 2.10 Fix an n-party randomized protocol Π, assume that each pi holds an input xi, and
fix some communication transcript c. Then, the probability that c is exchanged is
∏n
i=1 α
c
i (xi).
2.4 The Local Model
The local model (previously discussed in [11, 19]) is a simplified distributed communication model
where the parties communicate via a designated party – a curator4 – denoted C. The curator has
no local input. We will consider two types of differentially private local protocols – interactive and
non-interactive.
In non-interactive local protocols each party pi applies an ε-differentially private algorithm Si
on its private input xi and randomness ri, and sends Si(xi, ri) to C that then performs an arbitrary
computation and publishes its result.
In interactive local protocols the protocol proceeds in rounds, where in each round j the cu-
rator sends to each party pi a “query” message qi,j and party pi responds with the jth “answer”
Ai(xi, qi,1, . . . , qi,j, ri); the answer is a function of the party’s input xi, its random input ri, and the
first j queries. I.e., each round consists of two communication phases: first, the query messages are
sent by the curator, then, each party sends the appropriate response message.
We note that in the honest-but-curious setting we can assume, without loss of generality, that
the curator is deterministic, as randomness for the curator may be provided by parties in their first
message.
4Unlike in a centralized setting where the curator is a trusted party that collects raw private information, in the
local model the curator is a non-trusted party. In our setting, the curator is semi-honest.
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Definition 2.11 (Differential privacy in the local model) We say that a protocol Π in the
local model is ε-differentially private if the curator’s view preserves ε-differential privacy. Formally,
for all neighboring x,x′ and for every possible set VC of views of the curator:
Pr[ViewC(x) ∈ VC ] ≤ eε · Pr[ViewC(x′) ∈ VC ],
where ViewC(x) is the random variable containing the messages that C receives during the execution
of the protocol with private inputs x = (x1, . . . , xn) and the probability is taken over the random
inputs of the parties.
We note that ViewC(x) is defined in accordance with Definition 2.4 (with some abuse of notation,
as we write C instead of {C}). However, since C has no initial input and since C is assumed to
be deterministic, it is enough to include in ViewC(x) only the messages that C receives during the
execution of the protocol with inputs x = (x1, . . . , xn).
Differential privacy in the local model may be equivalently phrased as a requirement to preserve
the privacy of each party independently of other parties. We next give a definition in this spirit by
considering the probabilities that a party pi replies in a certain way to a given sequence of queries
with, say, xi = 0 and with, say, xi = 1. Any communication transcript c in an execution of the
protocol defines a transcript ci, where
ci = (qi,1, ai,1, . . . , qi,ℓ, ai,ℓ)
is the restriction of c to the messages transferred between party pi and the curator (recall that
in the local model every party communicates solely with the curator). Thus, we can use αcii (xi)
(see Notation 2.9) to denote the probability that pi with private input xi replies by ai,1, . . . , ai,ℓ
provided the curator has sent queries qi,1, . . . , qi,ℓ. Using this notation, we present the alternative
definition of privacy in the local model.
Definition 2.12 (Differential privacy in the local model by individual privacy) We say that
a protocol Π in the local model is ε-differentially private if the curator’s view preserves ε-differential
privacy with respect to each party separately. Formally, for every i ∈ [n] and for any possible com-
munication transcript ci = (qi,1, ai,1, . . . , qi,ℓ, ai,ℓ) between party pi and the curator (i.e., there exist
inputs x′1, . . . , x
′
n and random inputs r
′
1, . . . , r
′
n consistent with ci), and for every xi, yi ∈ D it holds
that
αcii (xi) ≤ eε · αcii (yi),
where the probabilities are taken over the random input of pi.
Claim 2.13 Definition 2.11 is equivalent to Definition 2.12.
Proof: We prove implications in both directions.
Definition 2.11 ⇒ Definition 2.12: Let Π be according to Definition 2.11. Given a possible
transcript ci of messages between party pi and C, choose any possible transcript c = (c1, . . . , cn)
that is consistent with ci. We get that for all xi, yi,
αcii (xi)
αcii (yi)
=
αcii (xi)
αcii (yi)
·
∏
j 6=i α
cj
j (xj)∏
j 6=i α
cj
j (xj)
=
Pr[ViewC(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn) = c]
Pr[ViewC(x1, . . . , xi−1, yi, xi+1, . . . , xn) = c]
≤ eε,
where the last equality follows by Lemma 2.10, and the last inequality follows from Π being
ε-differentially private according to Definition 2.11, noting that (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, xn) and
(x1, . . . , xi−1, yi, xi+1, xn) are neighboring.
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Definition 2.12 ⇒ Definition 2.11: Let π be according to Definition 2.12. Given a possible
transcript c = (c1, . . . , cn) and neighboring inputs (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, xn) and (x1, . . . , xi−1, yi, xi+1, xn),
we have that
Pr[ViewC(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn) = c]
Pr[ViewC(x1, . . . , xi−1, yi, xi+1, . . . , xn) = c]
=
αci (xi)
αci(yi)
·
∏
j 6=i α
c
j(xj)∏
j 6=i α
c
j(xj)
=
αcii (xi)
αcii (yi)
≤ eε,
where the first equality follows by Lemma 2.10 and the the inequality follows from Π being ε-
differentially private according to Definition 2.12. 
Claim 2.13 implies that, in the information-theoretic local model, requiring differential privacy
for the curator implies differential privacy with respect to every coalition.
2.5 Approximation
We will construct protocols whose outcome approximates a function f : Dn → R by a probabilistic
function, according to the following definition:
Definition 2.14 (Approximation) A randomized function fˆ : Dn → R is an additive (γ, τ)-
approximation for a (deterministic) function f if
Pr
[
|f(x)− fˆ(x)| > τ(n)
]
≤ γ(n)
for all x ∈ Dn. The probability is over the randomness of fˆ .
For example, by the properties of the Laplace distribution, Equation (1) yields an additive
(e−k, k ·GSf/ε)-approximation to f , for every k > 0.
2.6 The Binary Sum and Gap Threshold Functions
The binary sum function is defined to be SUMn(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑n
i=1 xi for xi ∈ {0, 1} (the subscript
n is omitted when it is clear from the context). We will use a gap (or promise) version of the
threshold function:
Definition 2.15 (Gap Threshold) For κ, τ > 0,
GAP-TRκ,τ (x1, . . . , xn) =
{
0 If SUMn(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ κ,
1 If SUMn(x1, . . . , xn) ≥ κ+ τ.
Note that GAP-TRκ,τ (x1, . . . , xn) is not defined when κ < SUMn(x1, . . . , xn) < κ+ τ .
It is easy to transform any (γ, τ/2)-approximation fˆ of SUM to a (γ, 0)-approximation gˆ to
GAP-TRκ,τ : given y = fˆ(x) for SUMn(x), set the gˆ(x) to be 0 if y ≤ κ+ τ/2 and 1 otherwise. We
get the following simple corollary:
Corollary 2.16 If there exists an ℓ-round, (t, ε)-differentially private protocol (resp. ε-differentially
private protocol in the local model) that (γ, τ/2)-approximates SUMn sending ρ messages, then for
every κ there exists an ℓ-round, (t, ε)-differentially private protocol (resp. ε-differentially private
protocol in the local model) that correctly computes GAP-TRκ,τ with probability at least 1 − γ,
sending at most ρ messages.
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Specifically, non-existence of (t, ε)-differentially private protocols for computing GAP-TR0,τ
correctly with n(t+1)/4 messages implies that there exists no (t, ε)-differentially private protocols
for computing SUMn with n(t+ 1)/4 messages and additive error magnitude τ/2. The next claim
asserts that the same non-existence also implies that, for any 0 ≤ κ ≤ n − τ , there exists no
(t, ε)-differentially private protocol for computing GAP-TRκ,τ correctly with n(t+ 1)/8 messages.
Again, it applies to both the distributed and the local models.
Claim 2.17 If for some 0 ≤ κ ≤ n − τ there exists an ℓ-round, (t, ε)-differentially private
(respectively, ε-differentially private in the local model) n-party protocol that correctly computes
GAP-TRκ,τ with probability at least γ sending at most ρ messages, then there exists an ℓ-round,
(t/2, ε)-differentially private (respectively, ε-differentially private in the local model) n/2-party pro-
tocol that correctly computes GAP-TR0,τ with probability at least γ sending at most ρ messages.
Proof: For κ ≤ n/2, given an n-party protocol Π that correctly computes GAP-TRκ,τ , de-
fine an n/2-party protocol Π′ for computing GAP-TR0,τ by simulating parties pn
2
+1, . . . , pn where
xn
2
+1, . . . , xn
2
+κ are set to 1 and xn
2
+κ+1, . . . , xn are set to 0. In the local model, a designated party,
say p1, can simulate these n/2 parties. In the distributed model, we let each party pi simulate party
pi+n/2.
Observe that in the distributed model any view v of a coalition T ′ of size t′ ≤ t/2 in some
execution of the resulting protocol, is exactly the view of the coalition T of size 2t′ ≤ t, implied
by T ′ (for pi ∈ T ′ we have pi, pi+n/2 ∈ T ), in the appropriate computation of the original protocol.
Moreover, any T ′-neighboring x,x′ define T -neighboring xy,x′y (where y = 1κ0
n
2
−κ), such that
Pr[ViewT (xy) = v] = Pr[ViewT ′(x) = v] and Pr[ViewT (x
′y) = v] = Pr[ViewT ′(x′) = v]. Thus, by
the privacy of the original protocol, the resulting protocol is (t/2, ε)-differentially private.
For κ > n/2, we can use the construction above to compute GAP-TRn−κ−τ,τ , by flipping all
input bits (that is, changing 1 to 0 and vise-versa) before engaging in the execution, running the
protocol, and finally flipping the result of the computation. 
3 Motivating Examples
We begin with two examples manifesting benefits of choosing an analysis together with a differen-
tially private protocol for computing it. In the first example, this paradigm yields more efficient
protocols than the natural paradigm; in the second example, it yields simpler protocols.
3.1 Binary Sum –
√
n Additive Error
We begin with a simple protocol for approximating SUMn within O(
√
n/ε)-additive approximation.
This protocol is well known as Randomized Response [25]. We describe the protocol in the (non-
interactive) local model, and it can be easily translated to a two round (and 2n messages) (n, ε)-
differentially private distributed protocol by letting some arbitrarily designated party (say p1) play
the role of C.
Let flipα(x) be a randomized bit flipping operator returning x with probability 0.5+α and 1−x
otherwise, where α = ε4+2ε . The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Each party pi with private input xi ∈ {0, 1} sends zi = flipα(xi) to C.
2. C locally computes and publishes k =
∑n
i=1 zi.
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3. Each party locally computes fˆ = (k − (0.5− α)n)/2α.
A total of O(n) messages and O(n log n) bits of communication are exchanged. To see that the
protocol satisfies the privacy requirement of Definition 2.12, note that
Pr[flipα(1) = 1]
Pr[flipα(0) = 1]
=
0.5 + α
0.5− α = 1 + ε ≤ e
ε,
and similarly Pr[flipα(0) = 0]/Pr[flipα(1) = 0] ≤ eε. To see that the protocol approximates the
sum function, note that
E[zi] = E[flipα(xi)] =
{
0.5 + α if xi = 1
0.5− α if xi = 0.
Thus,
E[k] = (0.5 + α) · SUM(x) + (0.5− α) · (n− SUM(x)) = 2α · SUM(x) + (0.5 − α)n,
and hence,
E[fˆ ] = E
[
k − (0.5 − α)n
2α
]
= SUM(x).
By an application of the Chernoff bound, we get that fˆ is an additive (O(1), O(
√
n/ε))-approximation
to SUM(·), that is, with constant probability, the error is O(√n/ε).
Remark 3.1 We next sketch an alternative ε-differentially private protocol that (O(1),
√
n/ε)-
approximates SUMn:
1. Each party pi with private input xi ∈ {0, 1} samples yi ∼ Lap(1/ε) and sends zi = xi + yi to
C.
2. C locally computes fˆ =
∑n
i=1 zi and publishes the result.
The privacy of the protocol follows from the arguments in Section 2.1.
Remark 3.2 The above constructions result in symmetric approximations to SUM(·) (i.e., the
output distribution depends solely on SUM(·) and not on the specific assignment). While these
differentially private protocols use O(n) messages, it can be shown that for such symmetric functions
that no efficient SFE protocols for such functions exist (see Section 6 for more details).
3.2 Distance from a Long Subsequence of 0’s
Our second function measures how many bits in a sequence x of n bits should be set to zero to get
an all-zero consecutive subsequence of length nα. In other words, the function should return the
minimum weight over all substrings of x of length nα bits:
DISTα(x) = min
i

i+nα−1∑
j=i
xj

 .
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For t ≤ n/2 we present a (t, ε, δ)-differentially private protocol5 approximating DISTα(x) with
additive error O˜(nα/3/ε).
In our protocol, we treat the n-bit string x (where xi is held by party pi) as a sequence of
n1−α/3 disjoint intervals, each nα/3 bit long. Let i1, . . . , in1−α/3 be the indices of the first bit in each
interval, and observe that minik(
∑ik+nα−1
j=ik
xj) is an n
α/3 additive approximation of DISTα. The
protocol for computing an approximation fˆ to DISTα is sketched below.
1. Every party pi generates a random variable Yi distributed according to the normal distribution
N(µ = 0, σ2 = 2R/n) where R =
2 log ( 2
δ
)
ε2
, and shares xi + Yi between the parties p1, . . . , pt+1
using an additive (t+ 1)-out-of-(t + 1) secret sharing scheme6.
2. Every party pi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ t+ 1, sums, for every interval of length nα/3, the shares it got
from the parties in the interval and sends this sum to p1.
3. For every interval of length nα/3, party p1 computes the sum of the t+ 1 sums it got for the
interval. By the additivity of the secret sharing scheme, this sum is equal to
Sk =
ik+n
α/3−1∑
j=ik
(xj + Yj) =
ik+n
α/3−1∑
j=ik
xj + Zk,
where Zk =
∑ik+nα/3−1
j=ik
Yj (notice that Zk ∼ N(µ = 0, σ2 = 2R)).
4. p1 computes mink
∑k+n2α/3
j=k Sk and sends this output to all parties.
Using the analysis of [9], this protocol is a (t, ε, δ)-differentially private protocol when 2t < n.
Furthermore, it can be shown that with high probability the additive error is O˜(nα/3/ε). To
conclude, we showed a simple 3 round protocol for DISTα.
This protocol demonstrates two advantages of the paradigm of choosing what and how together.
First, we choose an approximation of DISTα (i.e., we compute the minimum of subsequences
starting at a beginning of an interval). This approximation reduces the communication in the
protocol. Second, we leak information beyond the output of the protocol, as p1 learns the sums
Sk’s
7.
4 Lowerbounds on the Error of Binary Sum and Gap-Threshold
in the Local Model
We prove that any ℓ-round ε-differentially private protocol in the local model for computing the bi-
nary sum function must exhibit an additive error of Ω(
√
n/O˜(ℓ)). By Corollary 2.16 and Claim 2.17,
it suffices to prove that such a protocol can only compute GAP-TR0,τ for τ = Ω(
√
n/O˜(ℓ)) (i.e.,
5 (ε, δ)-differential privacy is a generalization, defined in [9], of ε-differential privacy where it is only required that
Pr[fˆ(x) ∈ V] ≤ eε · Pr[fˆ(x′) ∈ V] + δ .
6Shared secrets are taken from a finite domain by rounding the numbers log n digits after the point. This yields
no breach in privacy and adds a small magnitude of error.
7One can use the techniques of [6] to avoid leaking these sums while maintaining a constant number of rounds,
however the resulting protocol is less efficient.
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the parameter κ is set to zero). For that, we show that there are two input vectors – one containing
Ω(
√
n) ones, and the other is all zero – for which the curator sees similar distributions on the
messages, and hence must return similar answers.
We will begin by having the non-zero vector be distributed according to a probability distribu-
tion A (on n-bit vectors). This implies that a specific choice for this vector exists. In the following
we set
α
∆
=
1
ε
√
dn
, (3)
where d > 1 (the value of d, which is a function of the number of rounds in the protocol ℓ, is
determined later).
Notation 4.1 Define the distributionA on inputs from {0, 1}n as follows: a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn)
is chosen, where xi = 1 with probability α and xi = 0 with probability (1 − α) (each input xi is
chosen independently).
We use X to identify the random variable representing the joint input and Xi for the random
variable corresponding to its i-th coordinate. The notation PrA[·] is used when a probability over
the choice of X from A is considered. For a set D of possible curator’s views we use the notation
PrA[D] to denote the probability of the event that the view of the curator falls in D when the joint
input X is chosen according to A.
Main steps of the proof: In Section 4.1, we analyze properties of non-interactive differentially
private protocols in the local model, and show that a curator, trying to distinguish between an
input chosen according to distribution A and the all zero input, fails with constant probability. In
Section 4.2 we generalize this analysis to interactive protocols in the local model. In Section 4.3
we complete the proof of the lowerbound on the gap-threshold function in the local model.
4.1 Differentially Private Protocols in the Non-Interactive Local Model
Consider protocols in the non-interactive local model where each party holds an input xi ∈ {0, 1}
and independently applies an algorithm Si (also called a sanitizer) before sending the sanitized
result ci to the curator. We want to prove that if each Si is 2ε-differentially private for some
0 < ε ≤ 18, then the curator errs with constant probability when trying to distinguish between an
input chosen according to distribution A and 0 (where 0 is the vector 0n)9.
For every possible view c = (c1, . . . , cn) of the curator C, we consider the ratios of the probability
of receiving messages according to c when the input is chosen according to A and when it is 0. The
probability is over the randomness of the protocol, and over the choice according to distribution A
where specified:
r(c)
∆
=
PrA
[
ViewC(X) = c
]
Pr
[
ViewC(0) = c
] and ri(ci) ∆= PrA
[
Si(Xi) = ci
]
Pr
[
Si(0) = ci
] . (4)
8We can relax the condition ε ≤ 1 by a condition ε ≤ ε0 for any constant ε0 ≥ 1. This would affect some of the
constants in the calculations below.
9We consider protocols that are 2ε-differentially private to simplify the notation in Section 4.2.
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Since in a non-interactive protocol Pr[ViewC(0) = c] =
∏n
i=1 PrA[Si(0) = ci] (the sanitizers Si use
independent randomness) and PrA[ViewC(X) = c] =
∏n
i=1 PrA[Si(Xi) = ci] (the sanitizers Si use
independent randomness and the entries of the random variable X are chosen independently), we
have that
r(c) =
n∏
i=1
ri(ci). (5)
We next show that if the inputs are selected according to A, then with constant probability
r(c) is bounded by a constant. In other words, for those views c of the curator that are likely
when inputs are selected according to A, the probability of seeing c when the protocol is executed
with inputs selected according to A is similar to the probability of seeing c when the protocol is
executed with inputs set to zero.
Define a random variable C = (C1, . . . , Cn) where Ci = Si(Xi) and Xi is chosen according to
the distribution A. Defining the random variables Vi ∆= ln ri(Ci), we can write for every η > 0:
Pr
A
[r(C) > η] = Pr
A
[
n∏
i=1
ri(Ci) > η
]
= Pr
A
[
n∑
i=1
Vi > ln η
]
, (6)
where the first equality is by (5) above. In the next two lemmas we show that each variable Vi is
bounded, and bound its expectation. Both proofs use the 2ε-differential privacy of the sanitizers.
These bounds are then used with the Hoeffding bound in Lemma 4.5 where we bound PrA[r(C) > η].
Lemma 4.2 For every i and for any 0 < ε ≤ 1, with probability one, 1 − 2αε ≤ r(ci) ≤ 1 + 4αε
and −4αε ≤ Vi ≤ 4αε.
Proof: For every i and every value ci,
ri(ci) =
PrA[Si(Xi) = ci]
Pr[Si(0) = ci]
=
αPr[Si(1) = ci] + (1− α) Pr[Si(0) = ci]
Pr[Si(0) = ci]
= 1+α
(
Pr[Si(1) = ci]
Pr[Si(0) = ci]
− 1
)
.
Using e−2ε ≤ Pr[Si(1)=ci]Pr[Si(0)=ci] ≤ e2ε, we get that
1 + α(e−2ε − 1) ≤ ri(ci) ≤ 1 + α(e2ε − 1).
Using e2x < 1+ 4x and 1− e−2x < 2x for 0 < x ≤ 1, we get 1− 2αε ≤ ri(Ci) ≤ 1+ 4αε. Recall
that Vi = ln ri(Ci). Using ln(1 + x) ≤ x and ln(1 − x) ≥ −2x for 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5 and noting that
α = 1/(ε
√
dn) and hence 4αε≪ 0.5, we get that −4αε ≤ Vi ≤ 4αε. 
Lemma 4.3 For every i and for any 0 < ε ≤ 1,
E[Vi] ≤ 32α2ε2.
Proof: For the proof, we assume that the output of Si is in a countable set. Let
Bb
∆
= {ci : ri(ci) = 1 + b} for − 2αε ≤ b ≤ 4αε.
Lemma 4.2 implies that these are the only values possible for b. By the definition of ri, for every
ci ∈ Bb,
PrA[Si(Xi) = ci]
Pr[Si(0) = ci]
= r(ci) = 1 + b,
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and hence,
Pr[Si(0) ∈ Bb] = PrA[Si(Xi) ∈ Bb]
1 + b
≤ (1− b+ 2b2) · Pr
A
[Si(Xi) ∈ Bb]. (7)
Let β = 2αε. We next bound E[Vi]:
E[Vi] = EA[ln r(Ci)] =
∑
−β≤b≤2β
Pr
A
[Si(Xi) ∈ Bb] · ln(1 + b)
≤
∑
−β≤b≤2β
Pr
A
[Si(Xi) ∈ Bb] · b (8)
=
∑
−β≤b≤2β
Pr
A
[Si(Xi) ∈ Bb] · (1 + 2b2)−
∑
−β≤b≤2β
Pr
A
[Si(Xi) ∈ Bb] · (1 − b+ 2b2) (9)
Where (8) follows by ln(1+b) ≤ b. Using (7) we can replace the second term in (9) by∑−β≤b≤2β Pr[Si(0) ∈
Bb] and get
E[Vi] ≤ (1 + 2(2β)2)
∑
−β≤b≤2β
Pr
A
[Si(Xi) ∈ Bb]−
∑
−β≤b≤2β
Pr[Si(0) ∈ Bb]
= (1 + 8β2) · Pr
A
[Si(Xi) ∈ ∪bBb]− Pr[Si(0) ∈ ∪bBb]
≤ (1 + 8β2) · 1− 1 = 8β2 = 32α2ε2.

By Lemma 4.3, E[
∑n
i=1 Vi] =
∑n
i=1 E[Vi] ≤ 32α2ε2n = 32/d. We next prove Lemma 4.5 which
shows that
∑n
i=1 Vi is concentrated around this value. We use the Hoeffding bound:
Theorem 4.4 (Hoeffding bound) Let V1, . . . , Vn be independent random variables such that Vi ∈
[a, b] and
∑n
i=1 E[Vi] = µ. Then, for every t > 0,
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Vi − µ ≥ t
]
≤ exp
(
− 2 t
2
n(b− a)2
)
.
Lemma 4.5 PrA[r(C) > exp (ν/d)] < exp
(−(ν − 32)2/32d) for every ν > 32.
Proof: By Equation (6), Lemma 4.2, Lemma 4.3, and substituting α = 1
ε
√
dn
:
Pr
A
[r(C) > exp (ν/d)] = Pr
A
[
n∑
i=1
Vi >
ν
d
]
= Pr
A
[
n∑
i=1
Vi −
n∑
i=1
EVi >
ν
d
−
n∑
i=1
EVi
]
≤ Pr
A
[
n∑
i=1
Vi −
n∑
i=1
EVi >
ν
d
− n · 32α2ε2
]
≤ exp
(
−2 (
ν
d − n · 32α2ε2)2
64nα2 ε2
)
= exp
(−(ν − 32)2/32d) .
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We now rephrase Lemma 4.5 in a way that would be more convenient for our argument in the
next section. Let Π be a 2ε-private, non-interactive, local protocol, where 0 < ε ≤ 1. For a possible
curator’s view c, let
pA(c) = PrA
[ViewC(X) = c] and p0(c) = Pr[ViewC(0) = c],
where in pA(c) the probability is taken over the choice of X according to the distribution A and the
randomness of Π, and in p0(c) the probability is taken over the randomness of Π. The following
corollary follows from Lemma 4.5 and the definition of r in Equation (4).
Corollary 4.6 Assume we execute Π with input sampled according to distribution A, then for every
ν > 32, with probability at least 1− exp (−(ν − 32)2/32d), the curator’s view satisfies:
pA(c) ≤ exp (ν/d) · p0(c),
where the probability is taken over the random choice from A and the randomness of Π.
4.2 Differentially Private Protocols in the Interactive Local Model
In this section we generalize Corollary 4.6 to interactive local protocols where each party holds an
input xi ∈ {0, 1}. The structure of our argument is as follows:
1. We decompose an ℓ-round ε-differentially private protocol Π into ℓ non-interactive, local
protocols, and prove that each of the ℓ protocols is 2ε-differentially private. Thus, we can
apply Corollary 4.6 to each protocol.
2. We view the original protocol as a protocol between the curator and a single party, simulating
the other n parties. In this protocol the curator’s goal is to determine whether inputs are all
zero or they are sampled according to A. We apply a composition lemma to show that the
curator’s success probability does not increase by too much as ℓ grows. Clearly, this is true
also for the original protocol.
4.2.1 A Composition Lemma
Consider an interactive protocol, where a (deterministic) curator C sends adaptive queries to a
single (randomized) party p holding a private input x ∈ {0, 1} in a similar setup to that of the local
model (except that we make no requirement for ε-differential privacy). We assume that the party
p is stateless and that in each round 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, the protocol proceeds as follows:
1. In the first phase of round j, the curator C sends p a message qj (this message is also called
the query); this message is a function of the round number j and the messages the curator
got from p in the previous rounds.
2. In the second phase of round j, party p chooses fresh random coins and based on these coins
and the query qj it computes a message Vj and sends it to the curator. We consider the
randomized function computing the message Vj as an algorithm Aj , that is, Vj = Aj(x).
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Definition 4.7 We say that a possible outcome Vj is ε-good for algorithm Aj if Pr[Aj(1) =
V] ≤ eε Pr[A(0) = V], where the probabilities are taken over the randomness of algorithm Aj . An
algorithm Aj is (ε, δ)-good if Pr[Aj(1) is ε-good for Aj ] ≥ 1− δ, where the probability is taken over
the randomness of Aj .
Let Π be a protocol, as defined above, in which for every j and every transcript of messages
V1, . . . ,Vj−1, sent by p in rounds 1, . . . , j − 1, the curator C replies with a query qj, such that
the algorithm Aj resulting from qj is an (ε, δ)-good algorithm. Define a randomized algorithm Aˆ
that simulates the interaction between p and C, i.e., given input x ∈ {0, 1} it outputs a transcript
(q1,V1, q2,V2, . . . , qℓ,Vℓ) sampled according to Π(x).
Lemma 4.8 Aˆ is (ℓε, 1 − (1− δ)ℓ)-good.
Proof: Choose a random transcript (q1,V1, q2,V2, . . . , qℓ,Vℓ), and let A1, A2, . . . , Aℓ be the
algorithms defined by this transcript. By our assumptions all these algorithms are (ε, δ)-good.
Thus, with probability at least (1− δ)ℓ, the transcript Vˆ = (q1,V1, q2,V2, . . . , qℓ,Vℓ) is such that Vj
is ε-good for Aj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ. It suffices, hence, to prove that when that happens the transcript
Vˆ is ℓε-good for Aˆ, and indeed,
Pr[Aˆ(1) = (q1,V1, q2,V2, . . . , qℓ,Vℓ)] =
ℓ∏
j=1
Pr[Aj(1) = Vj ]
≤
ℓ∏
j=1
eε · Pr[Aj(0) = Vj]
= eℓε ·
ℓ∏
j=1
Pr[Aj(0) = Vj]
= eℓε · Pr[Aˆ(0) = (q1,V1, q2,V2, . . . , qℓ,Vℓ)].
The first and last equalities follow by independence and by the fact that the curator is deterministic.
The inequality follows by the ℓ-goodness of V1, . . . ,Vℓ. 
4.2.2 The Main Lemma
Let Π be an ℓ-round, local, ε-differentially private protocol, where 0 < ε ≤ 1. For a possible
curator’s view c, let
pA(c) = PrA
[ViewC(X) = c] and p0(c) = Pr[ViewC(0) = c],
where in pA(c) the probability is taken over the choice of X according to the distribution A and
the randomness of Π, and in p0(c) the probability is taken over the randomness of Π.
Lemma 4.9 Assume we execute Π with input sampled according to distribution A, then for every
ν > 32, with probability at least 1− ℓ · exp (−(ν − 32)2/32d), the curator’s view satisfies:
pA(c) ≤ exp (ℓν/d) · p0(c),
where the probability is taken over the random choice from distribution A and the randomness of
Π.
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Proof: Recall that in the interactive local model, a protocol is composed of ℓ-rounds where in
each round the curator sends a query to each party and the party sends an answer. We modify
the protocol, to make the parties stateless, by introducing the following changes to the interaction
between the curator and every party pi. Both changes do not affect the privacy of the protocol,
nor its outcome.
1. In round j the curator sends all queries and answers q1, a1, . . . , aj−1, qj it sent and received
from pi in previous rounds
10.
2. Party pi chooses a fresh random string in each round, that is, in round j, party pi chooses with
uniform distribution a random string that is consistent with the queries and answers it got in
the previous rounds (since we assume that the parties are computationally unbounded, such
choice is possible). Party pi uses this random string to answer the jth query. In other words,
we can consider pi as applying an algorithm Aj to compute the jth answer; this algorithm
depends on the previous queries and answers and uses an independent random string rj.
We next claim that Aj is 2ε-differentially private. That is, we claim that the probability that
aj is generated given the previous queries and answers is roughly the same when pi holds the bit
0 and when pi holds the bit 1. For a transcript c of the first j rounds between pi and the curator
C and for xi ∈ {0, 1}, we denote by Rxic the set of all random strings r, such that pi with private
input xi and random input r sends at each round messages according to c, provided it received
all messages according to c in previous rounds. Recall that Pr[rj ∈ Rxic ] is denoted αci (xi). Let
cj = q1, a1, . . . , qj−1, aj−1, qj , aj be a j-round transcript and let c′j = q1, a1, . . . , qj−1, aj−1, qj be the
prefix of cj without the jth round answer aj (that is, cj = c
′
j ◦ aj). Note that, since rj must be
consistent with the c′j , it holds for every xi ∈ {0, 1} that Pr[Aj(x1) = aj ] = Pr[rj ∈ Rx1cj |rj ∈ Rx1c′j ].
We therefore need to show that
e−2ε ≤ Pr[Aj(1) = aj ]
Pr[Aj(0) = aj ]
=
Pr[rj ∈ R1cj |rj ∈ R1c′j ]
Pr[rj ∈ R0cj |rj ∈ R0c′j ]
≤ e2ε,
To show that, we use the following two facts, which follow from Definition 2.12:
e−ε ≤ α
cj
i (1)
α
cj
i (0)
=
Pr[rj ∈ R1cj ]
Pr[rj ∈ R0cj ]
≤ eε, (10)
and
e−ε ≤ α
c′j
i (1)
α
c′j
i (0)
=
Pr[rj ∈ R1c′j ]
Pr[rj ∈ R0c′j ]
≤ eε (11)
Hence, we have
r
∆
=
Pr[Aj(1) = aj]
Pr[Aj(0) = aj]
=
Pr[rj ∈ R1cj ∧ rj ∈ R1c′j ]
Pr[rj ∈ R1c′j ]
·
Pr[rj ∈ R0c′j ]
Pr[rj ∈ R0cj ∧ rj ∈ R0c′j ]
=
Pr[rj ∈ R1cj ]
Pr[rj ∈ R1c′j ]
·
Pr[rj ∈ R0c′j ]
Pr[rj ∈ R0cj ]
=
α
cj
i (1)
α
cj
i (0)
· α
c′j
i (0)
α
c′j
i (1)
.
10To simplify notation, we omit the subscript i from the queries and answers.
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Now, by using the right inequality in Equation (10) and the left inequality in Equation (11), we
get that r ≤ e2ε and similarly, by using the left inequality in Equation (10) and the right inequality
in Equation (11), we get that r ≥ e−2ε. Thus, the answers of the n parties in round j are 2ε-private,
and we can apply Corollary 4.6 to the concatenation of the n answers.
We now use the above protocol to construct a protocol Π1 between a single party, holding
a one bit input x and a curator. Throughout the execution of the protocol the party simulates
all n parties as specified by the original protocol Π (i.e., sends messages to the curator with the
same distribution as the n parties send them). If the bit of the party in Π1 is 1 it chooses the n
input bits of the n parties in Π according to distribution A. If the bit of the party in Π1 is 0 it
chooses the n input bits of the n parties in Π to be the all-zero vector. By Corollary 4.6 we can
apply the composition lemma – Lemma 4.8 – to the composition of the ℓ, 2ε-differentially private,
non-interactive protocols and the lemma follows. 
Corollary 4.10 Let 0 < ε ≤ 1. For every ν > 32 and for every set D of views in an ℓ-round,
ε-differentially private, local protocol,
Pr[ViewC(0) ∈ D] ≥
PrA[ViewC(X) ∈ D]− ℓ · exp
(−(ν − 32)2/32d)
exp (ℓν/d)
.
Proof: Let
D1 =
{
c ∈ D : Pr
A
[ViewC(X) = c] ≤ exp (ℓν/d) Pr[ViewC(0) = c]
}
and
D2 =
{
c ∈ D : Pr
A
[ViewC(X) = c] > exp (ℓν/d) Pr[ViewC(0) = c]
}
.
That is, D2 = D \ D1. By Lemma 4.9, PrA[ViewC(X) ∈ D2] ≤ ℓ exp
(−(ν − 32)2/32d), and,
furthermore, Pr[ViewC(0) ∈ D1] ≥ PrA[ViewC(X) ∈ D1]/ exp (ℓν/d). Thus,
Pr[ViewC(0) ∈ D] ≥ Pr[ViewC(0) ∈ D1] ≥ PrA[ViewC(X) ∈ D1]
eℓν/d
=
PrA[ViewC(X) ∈ D]− PrA[ViewC(X) ∈ D2]
eℓν/d
≥ PrA[ViewC(X) ∈ D]− ℓe
−(ν−32)2/32d
eℓν/d
.

4.3 Completing the Lowerbound for Gap-Threshold and Sum in the Local
Model
We now complete the proof that in any ℓ-round, ε-differentially private, local protocols for the
gap-threshold function, namely, GAP-TR0,τ , if τ ≪
√
n and ℓ is small, then the curator errs with
constant probability.
Recall that we constructed the distribution A in which each bit in the input is chosen (inde-
pendently at random) to be one with probability α and zero with probability 1− α. Lemma 4.11,
which follows from a standard Chernoff bound argument, states that when generating a vector
(X1, . . . ,Xn) according to A, the sum
∑n
i=1Xi is concentrated around its expected value, which is
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αn (recall that α = 1/(ε
√
dn)). We apply the following Chernoff bound: Given n zero-one random
variables X1, . . . ,Xn and 0 < t < 1, Pr [
∑n
i=1Xi ≤ (1− t)µ] < exp
(
− t2µ2
)
, where µ =
∑n
i=1 E[Xi].
Lemma 4.11 PrA [
∑n
i=1Xi ≤ (1− γ)αn] < exp
(
−γ2
√
n
2ε
√
d
)
for every 0 < γ < 1.
Proof: We use the above bound with µ = αn =
√
n
ε
√
d
. Thus,
Pr
A
[
n∑
i=1
Xi ≤ (1− γ)αn
]
< exp
(
−αnγ
2
2
)
< exp
(
−γ
2√n
2ε
√
d
)
.

On one hand, by Corollary 4.10, the distributions on the outputs when the input vector is taken
from A and when it is the all zero vector are not far apart. On the other hand, by Lemma 4.11,
with high probability the number of ones in the inputs distributed according to A is fairly big.
These facts are used in Theorem 4.12 to prove the lowerbound.
Theorem 4.12 Let 0 < ε ≤ 1. There exist constants c > 0 and p > 0 such that in any ℓ-round,
ε-differentially private, local protocol for computing GAP-TR0,τ for τ = c
√
n
εℓ
√
log ℓ
the curator errs
with probability at least p.
Proof: Fix any ℓ-round, ε-differentially private, local protocol for computing GAP-TR0,τ . Recall
that in the local model the curator is assumed to be deterministic. Thus, the curator, having seen
its overall view of the execution of the protocol c, applies a deterministic algorithm G to c, where
G(c) is the output of the protocol (which supposed to answer GAP-TR0,τ (x1, . . . , xn) correctly).
Let τ = αn/2 =
√
n/(2ε
√
d).
Denote by D the set vectors of communication for which the curator answers 1, i.e., D
∆
=
{c : G(c) = 1}. The idea of the proof is as follows. If the probability of D under the distribution A
is small, then the curator has a big error when the inputs are distributed according to A. Otherwise,
by Corollary 4.10, the probability of D when the inputs are all zero is big, hence the curator has a
big error when the inputs are the all-zero string. Formally, there are two cases:
Case I: PrA[D] < 0.99. We consider the event that the sum of the inputs is at least τ = αn/2 and
the curator returns zero as an answer, that is, the curator errs.
We show that when the inputs are distributed according to A the probability of the comple-
mentary of this event is bounded away from 1. By the union bound the probability of the
complementary event is at most PrA [
∑n
i=1Xi < 0.5αn] + PrA[D]. By Lemma 4.11,
Pr
A
[D] + Pr
A
[
n∑
i=1
Xi < 0.5αn
]
≤ 0.99 + exp
(
−0.25√n/(2ε
√
d)
)
≈ 0.99.
Thus, in this case, with probability ≈ 0.01 the curator errs.
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Case II: PrA[D] ≥ 0.99. Here, we consider the event that the input is the all-zero string and the
curator answers 1, that is, the curator errs.
We use Corollary 4.10 and show that when the inputs are all zero, the probability of this
event is bounded away from 0 when taking ν = θ(ℓ log ℓ) and d = ℓν = θ(ℓ2 log ℓ),
Pr[ViewC(0) ∈ D] ≥
PrA[D]− ℓ exp
(−(ν − 32)2/32d)
exp (ℓν/d)
>
0.99− 0.5
exp (1)
> 0.01.
Thus, in this case, with probability at least 0.01, the curator errs. As d = θ(ℓ2 log ℓ), we get
that τ =
√
n/(2ε
√
d) = θ(
√
n/(εℓ
√
log ℓ)).

By applying the local model variant of Corollary 2.16, we get our lowerbound for SUMn as a
corollary of Theorem 4.12:
Corollary 4.13 Let 0 < ε ≤ 1. There exist constants δ > 0 and p > 0 such that in any ℓ-round,
ε-differentially private, local protocol for computing SUMn the curator errs with probability at least
p by at least δ
√
n
εℓ
√
log ℓ
.
Proof: Let Π be an ℓ-round, ε-differentially private, local protocol for computing SUMn, for
which the curator errs by at most τ with probability at most p. By Corollary 2.16 there exists an
ℓ-round, ε-differentially private, local protocol for computing GAP-TR0,2τ errs with probability at
most p. 
5 Lowerbounds for Binary Sum and Gap-Threshold in the Dis-
tributed Model
We prove that, in any ℓ-round, fixed-communication, (t, ε)-differentially private protocol computing
the binary sum with additive error less than
√
n/O˜(ℓ), the number of messages sent in the protocol
is Ω(nt). In the heart of our proof is the more general observation that in the information theoretic
setting, a party that has at most t neighbors must protect its privacy with respect to his neighbors,
since this set separates it from the rest of the parties. Thus, any such party, is essentially as limited
as any party participating in a protocol in the local communication model.
5.1 From Distributed to Local Protocols
We start with the transformation of a distributed protocol, using a small number of messages to a
protocol in the local model.
Lemma 5.1 If there exists an ℓ-round, fixed communication, (t, ε)-differentially private protocol
that (γ, τ)-approximates SUMn sending at most n(t+ 1)/4 messages, then there exists an (ℓ+ 1)-
round, ε-differentially private protocol in the local model that (γ, τ)-approximates SUMn/2.
Proof: The intuition behind the proof is that in the information theoretic model if an input of a
party affects the output, then the neighbors of this party must learn information on its input. Recall
that a party in a protocol Π is lonely if it communicates with at most t other parties and it is popular
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otherwise. If a party pi is lonely then it has most t neighbors, thus, from the privacy requirement
in (t, ε)-differentially private protocols, they are not allowed to learn “too much” information on
the input of pi. Therefore, the inputs of lonely parties cannot affect the output of the protocol by
too much, thus, since there are many lonely parties, the protocol must have a large error.
Formally, assume that there is a distributed protocol Π satisfying the conditions in the lemma.
As the protocol sends at most n(t+ 1)/4 messages, the protocol uses at most n(t+ 1)/4 channels.
Since each channel connects two parties, there are at least n/2 lonely parties. We will construct
a protocol in the local model which (γ, τ)-approximates SUMn/2 in two steps: In the first step,
which is the main part of the proof, we construct a protocol P in the local model which (γ, τ)-
approximates SUMn and only protects the privacy of the lonely parties. In the second step, we fix
the inputs of the popular parties and obtain a protocol P ′ for n/2 parties that protects the privacy
of all parties.
First Step. We convert the distributed protocol Π to a protocol P in the local model as follows:
Recall that in the local model each round consists of two phases where in the first phase the curator
sends queries to the parties and in the second phase parties send the appropriate responses. We
hence have a single round in P for every round of Π such that every message m that Party pj sends
to Party pk in round i in protocol Π, Party pj sends m to the curator in round i and the curator
sends m to Party pk in the first phase of round i+ 1. Finally, at the end of the protocol Party p1
sends the output to the curator.
We next prove that P protects the privacy of lonely parties. Without loss of generality, let
p1 be a lonely party, let T be the set of size at most t containing the neighbors of p1, and let
R = {p1, . . . , pn} \ (T ∪ {p1}). See Figure 1 for a description of these sets. Fix any neighboring
vectors of inputs x and x′ which differ on x1. The view of the curator in P contains all messages
sent in the protocol. It suffices to prove that for every view v,
Pr[ViewPC (x) = v] ≤ eε · Pr[ViewPC (x′) = v] (12)
(by simple summation it will follow for every set of views V).
R
p1
T
Figure 1: The partition of the parties to sets.
Fix a view v of the curator. For a set A, define αA and α
′
A as the probabilities in Π that in
each round the set A with inputs from x and x′ respectively sends messages according to v if it gets
messages according to v in previous rounds (these probabilities are taken over the random inputs
of the parties in A). Observe that if p1 /∈ A, then αA = α′A (since x and x′ only differ on x1). By
simulating p1, T , R by three parties and applying Lemma 2.10, and by the construction of P from
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ΠPr
[
ViewPC (x) = v
]
= α{p1} · αT · αR, and
Pr
[
ViewPC (x
′) = v
]
= α′{p1} · α′T · α′R = α′{p1} · αT · αR.
Thus, proving Equation (12) is equivalent to proving that
α{p1} ≤ eεα′{p1}. (13)
We use the (t, ε)-privacy of protocol Π to prove Equation (13). Let vT be the messages sent and
received by the parties in T in v. As T separates p1 from R, the messages in vT are all messages
in v except for the messages exchanged between parties in R. The view of T includes the inputs
of T in x, the messages vT , and the random inputs rT = {ri : pi ∈ T}. For a set A, define βA and
β′A as the probabilities that in Π in each round the set A with inputs from x and x
′ respectively
sends messages according to vT if it gets messages according to vT in previous rounds. Note that
β{p1} = α{p1} and β
′
{p1} = α
′
{p1} by the definition of P. By simulating p1, T , R by three parties,
where the random inputs of T are fixed to rT, and by Lemma 2.10,
Pr[ViewΠT (x) = (xT, rT, vT )] = α{p1} · βR, and
Pr[ViewΠT (x
′) = (xT, rT, vT )] = β′{p1} · β′R = α′{p1} · βR.
(recalling that xT = x
′
T
). The above probabilities are taken over the random strings of R and p1
when the random strings of T are fixed to rT. The (t, ε)-differential privacy of Π implies that
Pr[ViewΠT (x) = (xT, rT, vT )] ≤ eε Pr[ViewΠT (x′) = (xT, rT, vT )].
Thus, α{p1} ≤ eεα′{p1} and, therefore, P is ε-differentially private with respect to inputs of lonely
parties.
Second Step. There are at least n/2 lonely parties in Π; without loss of generality, parties
p1, . . . , pn/2 are lonely. We construct a protocol P ′ that (γ, τ)-approximates SUMn/2 by executing
Protocol P where (i) Party pi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n/2, with input xi sends messages in P ′ as the party
pi with input xi sends them in P; and (ii) In addition, the party p1 in P ′ simulates all other n/2
parties in P, that is, for every n/2 < i ≤ n, it chooses a random input ri for pi and in every round
it sends to the curator the same messages as pi would send with xi = 0 and ri. Since the curator
sees the same view in P and P ′ and since the privacy of lonely parties is protected in P, the privacy
of each of the n/2 parties in P ′ is protected. Protocol P ′, therefore, (γ, τ)-approximates SUMn/2
(since we fixed xi = 0 for n/2 < i ≤ n and P ′ returns the same output distribution of Π, which
(γ, τ)-approximates SUMn for all possible inputs). 
We are now ready to state the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 5.2 Let 0 < ε ≤ 1. There exist constants δ > 0 and γ > 0 such that in any ℓ-round,
fixed-communication, (t, ε)-differentially private protocol for approximating SUMn that sends at
most n(t+ 1)/4 messages the protocol errs with probability at least γ by at least δ
√
n
εℓ
√
log ℓ
.
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Proof: Assume, for sake of contradiction, that there is an ℓ-round, (t, ε)-differentially private
protocol Π for computing SUMn, which sends at most n(t+1)/4 messages and errs by at most τ =
δ
√
n
εℓ
√
log ℓ
with probability at least 1− γ. By Lemma 5.1 there exists an (ℓ+1)-round, ε-differentially
private, local protocol P for computing SUMn/2 which errs by at most τ = δ
√
n
εℓ
√
log ℓ
=
√
2δ
√
n/2
εℓ
√
log ℓ
with
probability at least 1− γ. This contradicts Corollary 4.13. 
Theorem 5.2 suggests that whenever we require that the error of a differentially private protocol
for approximating SUM to be of magnitude smaller than
√
n/ε, there is no reason to relinquish
the simplicity of the natural paradigm for constructing protocols. In this case, it is possible to
construct relatively simple efficient SFE protocols, which use O(nt) messages, and compute an
additive (O(1/ε), O(1))-approximation of SUM.
Remark 5.3 It can also be shown that in any ℓ-round, fixed-communication, (t, ε)-differentially
private protocol computing the GAP-TRκ,τ , for any 0 ≤ κ ≤ n− τ , the number of messages sent in
the protocol is Ω(nt), for τ =
√
n/O˜(ℓ). To show this, use the ideas similar to those of Lemma 5.1
and apply Theorem 4.12 to assert that any ℓ-round, fixed-communication, (t, ε)-differentially private
protocol computing the GAP-TR0,τ , the number of messages sent in the protocol is Ω(nt), for
τ =
√
n/O˜(ℓ). Then, using Claim 2.17, infer that the same is true for general κ.
6 SFE for Symmetric Approximations of Binary-Sum
In this section we show the advantage of using the alternative paradigm for constructing distributed
differentially private protocols whenever we allow an O(
√
n/ε) approximation. Recall that it is
possible to construct differentially private protocols for such approximations that use 2n messages
and are secure against coalitions of size up to t = n−1 (see Section 3.1). We next prove, using ideas
from Chor and Kushilevitz [5], that any SFE protocol for computing a symmetric approximation
for SUMn, using less than nt/4 messages, has error magnitude Ω(n).
We first give the definition of SFE protocols computing a given randomized function fˆ(·). Here,
again, we only consider protocols where all parties are honest-but-curious and compute the same
output. The definition is given in the information-theoretic model.
Definition 6.1 (SFE) Let fˆ : ({0, 1}∗)n → {0, 1}∗ be an n-ary randomized function. Let Π be an
n-party protocol for computing fˆ . For a coalition T ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, the view of T during an execution
of Π on x = (x1 . . . xn), denoted ViewT (x), is defined as in Definition 2.4, i.e., ViewT (x1, . . . , xn)
is the random variable containing the inputs of the parties in T (that is, {xi}i∈T ), the random
inputs of the parties in T , and the messages that the parties in T received during the execution of
the protocol with inputs x = (x1, . . . , xn).
We say that Π is a t-secure protocol for fˆ if there exists a randomized function, denoted S, such
that for every t′ ≤ t, for every coalition T = {i1, . . . , it′}, and for every inputs x = (x1 . . . xn), the
following two random variables are identically distributed:
• {S(T, (xi1 , . . . , xit′ ), o), o}, where o is obtained first by sampling fˆ(x) (recall that fˆ is a ran-
domized function) and then S is applied to (T, (xi1 , . . . , xit′ ), o).
• {ViewT (x),OutputΠ(ViewT (x))}, where OutputΠ(ViewT (x)) denotes the output during the
execution represented in ViewT (x).
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Claim 6.2 Let y and z be two inputs and T be a coalition of size at most t such that fˆ(y) and
fˆ(z) are identically distributed and yi = zi for every i ∈ T . In every t-secure protocol for fˆ , for
any possible view vT of the set T , it holds that Pr [ViewT (y) = vT ] = Pr [ViewT (z) = vT ].
Proof: Let T = {i1, . . . , it′} for t′ ≤ t. The two random variables
{
S(T,
(
yi1 , . . . , yit′
)
, o), o
}
and{
S(T, (zi1 , . . . , zit′ ), o), o
}
(as defined in Definition 6.1) are identically distributed since fˆ(y) and
fˆ(z) are identically distributed. Hence, by the t-security of the protocol, so do
{
ViewT (y),Output
Π(y)
}
and
{
ViewT (z),Output
Π(z)
}
. 
Definition 6.3 (Symmetric Randomized Function) We say that a randomized function fˆ
over domain D with range R is symmetric if it does not depend on the ordering on the coordi-
nates of the input, i.e., for every (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Dn and every permutation π : [n] → [n] the
distributions (over R) implied by fˆ(x1, . . . , xn) and by fˆ(xπ(1), . . . , xπ(n)) are identical.
Note that allowing O(nt) messages, it is fairly straightforward to construct a symmetric (t, ε)-
differentially private protocol with constant (O(1/ǫ)) additive error for SUMn, using the natural
paradigm with, say, the ε-private approximation described in Example 2.3. The following lemma
shows that Ω(nt) messages are essential whenever a symmetric approximation for SUMn is com-
puted by an SFE protocol, even if it is not required to preserve differential privacy.
Lemma 6.4 Let fˆ be a symmetric randomized function approximating SUMn such that for every
input vector x, it holds that Pr
[∣∣∣fˆ(x)− SUM(x)∣∣∣ < n/4] < 1/2, and let t ≤ n − 2. Every fixed-
communication t-secure protocol Π for computing fˆ uses at least n(t+ 1)/4 messages11.
Proof: Let Π be a t-secure protocol computing fˆ using less than n(t+ 1)/4 messages. Then,
there are at least n/2 lonely parties in Π. The intuition for the proof is that a lonely party does
not affect the computation, since its neighboring set, being smaller than t+ 1, would otherwise be
able to infer information about its input. The proof is given in two steps. In the first step, we show
that for any given lonely party pi, for any fixed inputs for all other parties, and for any transcript
c of the protocol, the probability of c being the transcript of the protocol when xi = 0 is exactly
the same as the probability of c being the transcript of the protocol when xi = 1. In the second
step of the proof, we use this to show that with probability at least 1/2, the protocol errs by n/4.
Without loss of generality, assume p1 is lonely and assume p2 is not a neighbor of p1. Let T
be the set of p1’s neighbors and let R = {p1, . . . , pn} \ (T ∪ {p1}) (in particular, p2 ∈ R). Recall
that for a transcript c we denote by αc1(x1), the probability that p1 is consistent with c with input
x1, namely, the probability that p1 with input x1 sends at each round messages according to c,
provided it received all messages according to c in previous rounds. Our goal in the first part of
the proof is to prove that for any transcript of the protocol c, it holds that αc1(0) = α
c
1(1). Toward
this end, we pursue the following proof structure.
• We first consider two inputs z and y such that SUM(z) = SUM(y), yi = zi for every i ∈ T ,
but y1 = 0 while z1 = 1. For every communication c exchanged in Π, denote cT to be the
11We note that the lemma does not hold for non-symmetric functions. For example, we can modify the bit flip
protocol described in Section 3 to an SFE protocol for a non-symmetric function, retaining the number of messages
sent (but not their length): in Step (2) p1 also sends z = (z1, . . . , zn), and in Step (3) each pi locally outputs fˆ+z2
−n,
treating z as an n-bit binary number.
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messages sent and received by the parties in T . By Claim 6.2, since fˆ is symmetric, the
probability of cT is the same with z and with y.
• We simulate the protocol Π by a three-party protocol Π′, where the parties are p1, T ,
and R, and each one of them simulates the respective set of parties in Π. We then use
Lemma 2.10 to write the probability that cT is the communication exchanged in Π as a prod-
uct of αcT1 (x1), α
cT
T (xT), and α
cT
R (xR), where xT (respectively, xR) are the inputs of parties
in T (respectively, in R). We conclude that
αcT1 (y1) · αcTT (yT) · αcTR (yR) = αcT1 (z1) · αcTT (zT) · αcTR (zR).
Furthermore, αcTT (yT) = α
cT
T (zT) (since yT = zT), thus,
αcT1 (y1) · αcTR (yR) = αcT1 (z1) · αcTR (zR).
• We then assert, by considering all prefices of cT , that each factor of these two multiplications
is the same in both cases and hence αc1(0) = α
cT
1 (0) = α
cT
1 (1) = α
c
1(1).
Formal proof. Fix any inputs x3, . . . , xn for the parties p3, . . . , pn. Let y be the input vector
y1 = 0, y2 = 1, and yk = xk for 3 ≤ k ≤ n,
and let z be the input vector
z1 = 1, z2 = 0, and zk = xk for 3 ≤ k ≤ n.
We first claim that the distribution over the views of T when the protocol is executed with y is
the same as when the protocol is executed with z. As SUM(y) = SUM(z) and fˆ is symmetric,
fˆ(y) and fˆ(z) are identically distributed. Hence, by Claim 6.2, for any possible view vT of the
set T , it holds that Pr [ViewT (y) = vT ] = Pr [ViewT (z) = vT ]. Thus, since the view of T contains
the transcript cT of messages sent between the parties in T and the parties in {p1} ∪ R, we have
that for any such possible transcript cT , the probability that the parties send messages according
to cT is the same when the protocol is executed with y and when the protocol is executed with z.
Furthermore, for any possible prefix c′T of any transcript cT of T , the probability of messages sent
according to c′T when executing Π with input y is the same as when executing Π with input z. This
is true as this probability is merely the sum over the probabilities of all transcripts completing c′T .
Without loss of generality, we can analyze the execution of the protocol as if at each round only
a single message is sent by a single party. Let j be such that p1 sends a message in round j and
denote by hj = hj−1,mj, the prefix of cT also viewed by p1 (messages sent or received by p1) in
the first j rounds, where hj−1 is the history of messages viewed by p1 in the first j − 1 rounds, and
mj is the message p1 sends in round j, according to cT . By the argument above, the probabilities
of hj−1 being seen by p1 are the same when the protocol is executed with y and when the protocol
is executed with z and the probabilities of hj being seen by p1 are the same when the protocol is
executed with y and when the protocol is executed with z. Thus, the probabilities of p1 sending mj
having seen message history hj−1 are the same when x1 = 0 and when x1 = 1. Since the probability
of p1 being consistent with a view cT (of T ) is the product of the probabilities that it is consistent
at each round, we have αcT1 (0) = α
cT
1 (1). Let c be a full transcript of the protocol, and cT be its
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restriction to messages sent between parties in T and parties in {p1}∪R. Since p1 does not see any
message in c that is not in cT , it holds for every x1 that α
c
1(x1) = α
cT
1 (x1). Thus, α
c
1(0) = α
c
1(1).
Hence, we proved that for any lonely party pi, and any full transcript of the protocol c, it holds
that αci (0) = α
c
i (1). Consider the all zero input vector and the input vector x such that xi = 1 if
and only if pi is lonely. By Lemma 2.10 we have that for any given full transcript c, the probability
of c being exchanged with 0 is exactly the probability of c being exchanged with x. Thus, if with
probability at least 1/2, when executing the protocol with 0, the exchanged transcript implies a
value less than n/4, then with probability at least 1/2, the protocol errs by at least n/4 when
executed with x. Otherwise, with probability at least 1/2, the protocol errs by at least n/4 when
executed with 0. 
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